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Abstract We introduce an extendedmathematical programming framework for specifying equilibriumprob-
lems and their variational representations, such as generalizedNash equilibrium,multiple optimization prob-
lems with equilibrium constraints, and (quasi-) variational inequalities, and computing solutions of them
from modeling languages. We define a new set of constructs with which users annotate variables and equa-
tions of the model to describe equilibrium and variational problems. Our constructs enable a natural trans-
lation of the model from one formulation to another more computationally tractable form without requiring
the modeler to supply derivatives. In the context of many independent agents in the equilibrium, we facilitate
expression of sophisticated structures such as shared constraints and additional constraints on their solutions.
We define a new concept, shared variables, and demonstrate its uses for sparse reformulation, equilibrium
problems with equilibrium constraints, mixed pricing behavior of agents, and so on. We give some equilib-
rium and variational examples from the literature and describe how to formulate them using our framework.
Experimental results comparing performance of various complementarity formulations for shared variables
are given. Our framework has been implemented and is available within GAMS/EMP.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present an extended mathematical programming (EMP) framework for specifying equilib-
rium problems and their variational representations and computing solutions of them in modeling languages
such as AMPL, GAMS, or Julia [2,4,12]. Equilibrium problems of interest are (generalized) Nash equilib-
rium problems (GNEP) and multiple optimization problems with equilibrium constraints (MOPEC), and we
consider quasi-variational inequalities (QVI) in their variational forms. All of these problems have been used
extensively in the literature, see for example [3,9,15,24].
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The GNEP is a Nash game between agents with non-disjoint strategy sets. For a given number of agents
N, x∗ = (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N) is a solution to the GNEP if it satisfies
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi∈Ki(x
∗
−i)⊂R
ni
fi(xi,x
∗
−i), for i= 1, . . . ,N, (GNEP)
where fi(xi,x−i) is the objective function of agent i, and Ki(x−i) is its feasible region. Note that the objective
function and the feasible region of each agent are affected by the decisions of other agents, denoted by
x−i = (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xN). If each agent’s feasible region is independent of other agents’ decisions,
that is, Ki(x−i) ≡ Ki for some nonempty set Ki, then the problem is called a Nash equilibrium problem
(NEP).
In addition to the GNEP or NEP setting, if we have an agent formulating some equilibrium conditions,
such as market clearing conditions, as a variational inequality (VI) whose definition is given in Section 2,
we call the problem multiple optimization problems with equilibrium constraints (MOPEC). For example,
x∗ = (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N ,x
∗
N+1) is a solution to the MOPEC if it satisfies
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi∈Ki(x
∗
−i)⊂R
ni
fi(xi,x
∗
−i), for i= 1, . . . ,N,
x∗N+1 ∈ SOL(KN+1(x
∗
−(N+1)),F(·,x
∗
−(N+1))),
(MOPEC)
where SOL(K,F) denotes the solution set of a variational inequality VI(K,F), assuming thatKN+1(x−(N+1))
is a nonempty closed convex set for each given x−(N+1) and F(x) is a continuous function. We call agent i
for i= 1, . . . ,N an optimization agent and agent (N+ 1) an equilibrium agent.
Solutions of these problems using modeling languages are usually obtained by transforming the problem
into their equivalent complementarity form, such as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), and then
solving the complementarity problem using a specialized solver, for example PATH [6]. This implies that
users need to compute the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of each optimization agent by hand and
then manually specify the complementarity relationships within modeling languages [11,26]. Similar trans-
formations are needed to formulate equilibrium problems in their variational forms represented by QVIs as
we show in Section 2.
This approach has several drawbacks. It is time-consuming and error-prone because of the derivative
computation. The problem structure becomes lost once it is converted into the complementarity form: it is
difficult to tell what the original model is and which agent controls what variables and equations (functions
and constraints) by just reading the complementarity form. For QVI formulations, we lose the information
about what variables are used as parameters to define the feasible region. All variables and equations are
endogenous in that form. This may restrict opportunities for back-end solvers to detect and make full use of
the problem structure. Modifying the model such as adding/removing variables and equations may not be
easy: it typically involves a lot of derivative recomputation.
For more intuitive and efficient equilibrium programming, that is, formulatingGNEP,MOPEC, or QVI in
modeling languages, the paper [10] brieflymentioned that the EMP framework can be used to specify GNEPs
and MOPECs. The goal of EMP is to enable users to focus on the problem description itself rather than
spending time and checking errors on the complementarity form derivation. Users annotate variables and
equations of the problem in a similar way to its algebraic representation and write them into an empinfo file.
The modeling language reads that file to identify high level structure of the problem such as the number of
agents and agent’s ownership of variables and equations. It then automatically constructs the corresponding
complementarity form and solves it using complementarity solvers. However, neither detailed explanations
about its underlying assumptions and how to use it are given, nor are the QVI formulations considered
in [10].
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In this paper, we present detailed explanation of the existing EMP framework for equilibrium program-
ming for the first time. We also describe its extensions to incorporate some new sophisticated structures,
such as shared constraints, shared variables, and QVI formulations, and their implications with examples
from the literature. Our extensions allow a natural translation of the algebraic formulation into modeling
languages while capturing high level structure of the problem so that the back-end solver can harness the
structure for improved performance.
Specifically, our framework allows shared constraints to be represented without any replications and
makes it easy to switch between different solution types associated with them, for example variational equi-
librium [9, Definition 3.10]. We introduce a new concept, shared variables, and show their manifestations
in the literature. Shared variables have potential for many different uses: i) they can be used to reduce the
density of the model; ii) they can model some EPECs sharing the same variables and constraints to rep-
resent equilibrium constraints; iii) we can easily switch between price-taking and price-making agents in
economics models; iv) they can be used to model shared objective functions. The last case opens the door
for our framework to be used to model the block coordinate descent method, where agents now correspond
to a block of variables. Finally, we define a new construct that allows QVI formulations to be specified in an
intuitive and natural way. The new features have been implemented and are available within GAMS/EMP. In
this case, we use a problem reformulation solver JAMS, and choose formulations if necessary in an option
file jams.opt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the equilibrium formulations
our framework allows. We describe conditions under which the complementarity form is equivalent to the
given equilibrium problem and its variational form. Section 3 presents the underlying assumptions of the
existing framework and shows how we can model equilibrium problems satisfying these assumptions. In
Sections 4-5, we present sophisticated structures that violate the assumptions and introduce our modifications
to incorporate them into our framework. Section 4 describes shared constraints and presents a new construct
to define the type of solutions, either GNEP equilibria or variational equilibria, associated with them. In
Section 5, we introduce shared variables and various complementarity formulations for them. Section 6
presents a new construct to specify QVIs and compares two equivalent ways of specifying equilibrium
problems in either GNEP or QVI form. At the end of each section of Sections 3-6, we provide examples
from the literature that can be neatly formulated using the feature of our framework. Section 7 concludes the
paper, pointing out some areas for future extensions.
2 Preliminaries
For given equilibrium problems or their variational forms, the default action of our framework converts
them into MCPs and computes a solution to those complementarity problems. In this section, we describe
equivalences of the equilibrium problems with quasi-variational inequalities, variational inequalities, and
mixed complementarity problems.
We first introduce QVIs, VIs, and MCPs in a finite-dimensional space. For a given continuous function
F :Rn →Rn and a point-to-set mapping K(x) :Rn⇒Rn where K(x) is a closed convex set for each x ∈Rn,
x∗ ∈ K(x∗) is a solution to the QVI(K,F) if
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K(x∗), (QVI)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the Euclidean inner product.
If we restrict the point-to-set mapping K(·) to be a fixed closed convex set K ⊂ Rn, then x∗ ∈ K is a
solution to the VI(K,F) if
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (VI)
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If we further specialize to the case where the feasible region is a box B= {x ∈ Rn | li ≤ xi ≤ ui, for i=
1, . . . ,n} with li ≤ ui and li ∈ R∪{−∞} and ui ∈ R∪{∞}, the VI(B,F) is typically termed a mixed com-
plementary problem. In this case, x∗ ∈ B is a solution to the MCP(B,F) if one of the following conditions
holds for each i= 1, . . . ,n:
x∗i = li, Fi(x
∗)≥ 0,
li ≤ x
∗
i ≤ ui, Fi(x
∗) = 0,
x∗i = ui, Fi(x
∗)≤ 0.
(MCP)
In shorthand notation, the above condition is written as l ≤ x∗ ≤ u ⊥ F(x∗). We sometimes put a bound con-
straint on a function explicitly when the corresponding variable has only one-sided bound and useMCP(x,F)
when the feasible region of x is clear from the context.
Throughout this paper, we assume by default that equilibrium problems are of the form (MOPEC), and
there are (N+1) number of agents where the first N agents are optimization agents, and the (N+1)th agent
is an equilibrium agent. When there is no equilibrium agent, then the problem becomes a (generalized) Nash
equilibrium problem. If there are no optimization agents but a single equilibrium agent, then the problem is
a variational inequality. All results in this section hold in the case where either type of agent is not present.
The results described below are simple extensions of the existing results found in [15]. We first show the
equivalence between the equilibrium problems and their associated QVIs.
Proposition 1 If fi(·, ·) is continuously differentiable, fi(·,x−i) is a convex function, and Ki(x−i) is a closed
convex set for each given x−i, then x
∗ is a solution to the equilibrium problem (MOPEC) if and only if it is a
solution to the QVI(K,F) where
K(x) =
N+1
∏
i=1
Ki(x−i),
F(x) = (∇x1 fi(x1,x−1)
⊤, . . . ,∇xN fN(xN ,x−N)
⊤,G(xN+1,x−(N+1))
⊤)⊤.
Proof (⇒) Let x∗ be a solution to (MOPEC). For optimization agents, the first-order optimality conditions
are necessary and sufficient by the given assumption. Therefore we have
〈∇xi fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i),xi− x
∗
i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Ki(x
∗
−i), for i= 1, . . . ,N.
Also we have
〈G(x∗N+1,x
∗
−(N+1)),xN+1− x
∗
N+1〉 ≥ 0, ∀xN+1 ∈ KN+1(x
∗
−(N+1)).
The result follows.
(⇐) Let x∗ be a solution to the QVI(K,F). The result immediately follows from the fact that K(x) is a
product space of Ki(x−i)’s for i= 1, . . . ,N+ 1. ⊓⊔
If each agent i has knowledge of a closed convex set X and use this to define its feasible region Ki(x−i)
using a shared constraint Ki(x−i) := {xi ∈ R
ni | (xi,x−i) ∈ X}, then the QVI(K,F) can be solved using a
simpler VI(X ,F).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Ki(x−i) = {xi ∈ R
ni | (xi,x−i) ∈ X} for i = 1, . . . ,N+ 1 with X being a closed
convex set. If x∗ is a solution to the VI(X ,F) with F defined in Proposition 1, then it is a solution to the
QVI(K,F), thus it is a solution to (MOPEC) with the same assumptions on fi(·) given in Proposition 1. The
converse may not hold.
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Proof (⇒) Let x∗ be a solution to the VI(X ,F). Clearly, x∗ ∈ K(x∗). We prove by contradiction. Suppose
there exists x∈K(x∗) such that 〈F(x∗),x−x∗〉< 0. There must exist i∈ {1, . . . ,N+1} satisfying 〈Fi(x
∗),xi−
x∗i 〉< 0. Set x˜= (xi,x
∗
−i). As xi ∈ Ki(x
∗
−i), x˜ ∈ X . Then, 〈F(x
∗), x˜− x∗〉< 0, which is a contradiction.
(:) See the example in Section 3 of [15]. ⊓⊔
When the constraints are explicitly given as equalities and inequalities with a suitable constraint qual-
ification holding, we can compute a solution to the equilibrium problems using their associated MCP and
vice versa. Throughout this section, by a suitable constraint qualification we mean a constraint qualification
implying the KKT conditions hold at a local optimal solution, for example the Mangasarian-Fromovitz or
the Slater constraint qualification. Also when we say a constraint qualification holds at x, we imply that it
holds at xi ∈ Ki(x−i) for each agent i.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Ki(x−i) = {xi ∈ [li,ui] | hi(xi,x−i) = 0,gi(xi,x−i) ≤ 0} where hi(·) : R
n → Rvi
is an affine function, each gi(·) : R
n → Rmi is continuously differentiable and a convex function of xi and
li ≤ ui, li ∈ R
ni ∪{−∞}ni, and ui ∈ R
ni ∪{∞}ni . With the same assumptions on fi given in Proposition 1, x
∗
is a solution to (MOPEC) if and only if (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) is a solution to the MCP(B,F), assuming that a suitable
constraint qualification holds at x∗ with
B=
N+1
∏
i=1
[li,ui]×R
v×Rm−, v=
N+1
∑
i=1
vi, m=
N+1
∑
i=1
mi,
F(x,λ ,µ) = ((∇x1 f1(x)−∇x1h1(x)λ1−∇x1g1(x)µ1)
⊤, . . . ,
(∇xN fN(x)−∇xNhN(x)λN −∇xNgN(x)µN)
⊤,
(G(x)−∇xN+1hN+1(x)λN+1−∇xN+1gN+1(x)µN+1)
⊤,
h1(x)
⊤, . . . ,hN+1(x)
⊤,
g1(x)
⊤, . . . ,gN+1(x)
⊤)⊤.
Proof (⇒) Let x∗ be a solution to (MOPEC). Using the KKT conditions of each optimization agent and the
VI, and constraint qualification at x∗, there exist (λ ∗,µ∗) such that
∇xi fi(x
∗)−∇xihi(x
∗)λ ∗i −∇xigi(x
∗)µ∗i ⊥ li ≤ x
∗
i ≤ ui, for i= 1, . . . ,N,
G(x∗)−∇xihi(x
∗)λ ∗i −∇xigi(x
∗)µ∗i ⊥ li ≤ x
∗
i ≤ ui, for i= N+ 1,
0= hi(x
∗) ⊥ λ ∗i free, for i= 1, . . . ,N+ 1,
0≥ gi(x
∗) ⊥ µ∗i ≤ 0, for i= 1, . . . ,N+ 1.
(1)
Thus (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) is a solution to the MCP(B,F).
(⇐) Let (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) be a solution to the MCP(B,F). Then (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) satisfies (1). Since the constraint
qualification holds at x∗, we have NKi(x∗−i)
= {−∇xihi(x
∗)λi−∇xigi(x
∗)µi | 0= hi(x
∗)⊥ λi,0≥ gi(x
∗)⊥ µi ≤
0}+N[li,ui](x
∗
i ) for i= 1, . . . ,N+ 1. The result follows from convexity. ⊓⊔
If the convexity assumptions on the objective functions and the constraints of optimization agents’ prob-
lems do not hold, then one can easily check that a stationary point to (MOPEC) is a solution to the MCP
model defined in Proposition 3 and vice versa. By a stationary point, we mean that x∗i satisfies the first-
order optimality conditions of each optimization agent i’s problem, and x∗N+1 is a solution to the equilibrium
agent’s problem.
Finally, we present the equivalence between QVIs and MCPs.
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Proposition 4 For a given QVI(K,F), suppose that K(x) = {l ≤ y ≤ u | h(y,x) = 0,g(y,x) ≤ 0} where
h : Rn×n → Rv and g : Rn×n → Rm. Assuming that a suitable constraint qualification holds, x∗ is a solution
to the QVI(K,F) if and only if (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) is a solution to the MCP(B, F˜) where
B= [l,u]×Rv×Rm−,
F˜(x,λ ,µ) =

F(x)−∇yh(x,x)λ −∇yg(x,x)µh(x,x)
g(x,x)


Proof By applying similar techniques used in the proof of Proposition 3, we get the desired result. ⊓⊔
For a given equilibrium problem or quasi-variational inequality our framework generates the MCPmodel
defined in Propositions 3-4, respectively, and solves it using PATH. If the feasible region is defined by a
shared constraint, users can choose between the VI defined in Proposition 2 and the MCP by specifying the
solution type. This will be discussed in Section 4. Other extensions are found in Sections 5-6. While this
constitutes one method of solution, the ability to define the structured equilibria explicitly opens the door for
new solution methods [17].
3 Modeling equilibrium problems using the existing EMP framework
We now describe how to specify equilibrium problems in modeling languages using the EMP framework.
While this is implemented in GAMS syntax, the extension to other modeling systems is straightforward.
We first present the underlying assumptions on the specification and discuss their limitations in Section 3.1.
Examples from the literature are given in Section 3.2. In Sections 4-5, we relax these assumptions to take
more sophisticated structures into account.
3.1 Specifying equilibrium problems and underlying assumptions
Standard equilibrium problems can be specified in modeling languages using our framework. Suppose that
we are given the following NEP:
find (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N) satisfying,
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi
fi(xi,x
∗
−i),
subject to hi(xi) = 0,
gi(xi)≤ 0, for i= 1, . . . ,N.
(2)
We need to specify each agent’s variables, its objective function, and constraints. Functions and con-
straints are given as a closed-form in modeling languages: they are explicitly written using combinations of
mathematical operators such as summation, multiplication, square root, log, and so on. The EMP partitions
the variables, functions, and constraints among the agents using annotations given in an empinfo file. For
example, we may formulate and solve (2) within GAMS/EMP as follows:
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Listing 1: Modeling the NEP
1 variables obj(i), x(i);
2 equations deff(i), defh(i), defg(i);
4 ∗ Definitions of deff(i), defh(i), and defg(i) are omitted for expository purposes.
6 model nep / deff, defh, defg /;
8 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
9 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
10 loop(i,
11 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), deff(i), defh(i), defg(i) /;
12 );
13 putclose;
15 solve nep using emp;
Let us explain Listing 1. Variable obj(i) holds the value of fi(x), x(i) represents variable xi, and
deff(i), defh(i), and defg(i) are the closed-form definitions of the objective function fi(x) and the
constraints hi(xi) and gi(xi), respectively, for i= 1, . . . ,N. Equations listed in the model statement and vari-
ables in these equations constitute the model nep.
Once the model is defined, a separate empinfo file is created to specify the equilibrium problem. In the
above case, the empinfo file has the following contents:
equilibrium
min obj(’1’) x(’1’) deff(’1’) defh(’1’) defg(’1’)
...
min obj(’N’) x(’N’) deff(’N’) defh(’1’) defg(’N’)
The equilibrium keyword informs EMP that the annotations are for an equilibrium problem. A list of
agents’ problem definitions separated by either a min or max keyword for each optimization agent follows.
For each min or max keyword, the objective variable to optimize and a list of agent’s decision variables
are given. After these variables, a list of equations that define the agent’s objective function and constraints
follows. We say that variables and equations listed are owned by the agent. Note that variables other than
x(’1’) that appear in deff(’1’), defh(’1’), or defg(’1’) are treated as parameters to the first agent’s
problem; that is howwe define x−i. The way each agent’s problem is specified closely resembles its algebraic
formulation (2), and our framework reconstructs each agent’s problem by reading the empinfo file.
The framework does not require any special keyword to distinguish between a NEP and a GNEP. If
the function hi or gi is defined using other agents’ decisions, that is, hi(xi,x−i) = 0 or gi(xi,x−i) ≤ 0, the
equilibrium model written in Listing 1 becomes a GNEP. The distinction between the NEP and the GNEP
depends only on how the constraints are defined.
Note that in the empinfo file above, each variable and equation is owned exclusively by a single agent.
There is no unassigned variable or equation. In the standard framework, neither multiple ownership nor
missing ownership are allowed; otherwise an error is generated. Formally, the standard framework assumes
the following:
Assumption 1 A model of an equilibrium problem described by equations and variables is assumed to have
the following properties in the empinfo file:
– Each equation of the model is owned by a single agent.
– Each variable of the model is owned by a single agent.
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An implication of Assumption 1 is that the current framework does not allow shared objective functions,
shared constraints, and shared variables. Sections 4-5 give examples of problems that violate Assumption 1
and provide techniques to overcome or relax the requirements.
The MOPEC model can be defined in a very similar way. Suppose that we are given the following
MOPEC:
find (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N , p
∗) satisfying,
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi
fi(xi,x
∗
−i),
subject to hi(xi,x
∗
−i) = 0,
gi(xi,x
∗
−i)≤ 0, for i= 1, . . . ,N,
p∗ ∈ SOL(K(x∗),V (p,x∗)),
where K(x∗) := {p | w(p,x∗)≤ 0}.
(3)
Assuming that p ∈ Rr, we can then formulate (3) within GAMS/EMP in the following way:
Listing 2: Modeling the MOPEC
1 variables obj(i), x(i), p(j);
2 equations deff(i), defh(i), defg(i), defV(j), defw;
4 model mopec / deff, defh, defg, defV, defw /;
6 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
7 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
8 loop(i,
9 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), deff(i), defh(i), defg(i) /;
10 );
11 put ’vi defV p defw’ /;
12 putclose empinfo;
In addition to optimization agents, we now have an equilibrium agent defined with the ’vi’ keyword
in Listing 2. The ’vi’ keyword is followed by variables, function-variable pairs, and constraints. Functions
paired with variables constitute a VI function, and the order of functions and variables appeared in the pair
is used to determine which variable is assigned to which function when we compute the inner product in
the (VI) definition. In this case, we say that each VI function is matched with each variable having the same
order in the pair, i.e., defV(j) is matched with p(j) for each j = 1, . . . ,r. After all matching information
is described, constraints follow. Hence, the VI function is defV, its variable is p, and defw is a constraint.
The functions fi, hi, and gi, defined in deff(i), defh(i), and defg(i) equations, respectively, may now
include the variable p. One can easily verify that the specification in the empinfo file satisfies Assumption 1.
Variables, that are used only to define the constraint set and are owned by the VI agent, must be specified
before any explicit function-variable pairs. In this case, we call those variables preceding variables. The
interface automatically assigns them to a zero function, that is, a constant function having zero value. For
example, if we specify ‘vi z Fy y’ where z and y are variables and Fy is a VI function matched with
y, then z is a preceding variable. In this case, our interface automatically creates an artificial function Fz
defined by F(z)≡ 0 and matches it with variable z.
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3.2 Examples
Examples of NEP, GNEP, and MOPEC taken from the literature are formulated in the following sections
using the EMP framework.
3.2.1 NEP
We consider the following oligopolistic market equilibrium problem [13,21]:
find (q∗1, . . . ,q
∗
5) satisfying,
q∗i ∈ argmax
qi≥0
qip
(
5
∑
j=1, j 6=i
q∗j + qi
)
− fi(qi),
where p(Q) := 50001/1.1(Q)−1/1.1,
fi(qi) := ciqi+
βi
βi+ 1
K
−1/βi
i q
(βi+1)/βi
i ,
(ci,Ki,βi) is problem data, for i= 1, . . . ,5.
(4)
There are five firms, and each firm provides a homogeneous product with amount qi to the market while
trying to maximize its profit in a noncooperative way. The function p(·) is the inverse demand function, and
its value is determined by the sum of the products provided by all the firms. The function fi(·) is the total
cost of firm i. The problem (4) is a NEP.
Listing 3 shows an implementation of (4) within GAMS/EMP. As we see, the empinfo file is a natural
translation of the algebraic form of (4). Using the same starting value as in [13,21], our GAMS/EMP im-
plementation computed a solution q∗ = (36.933,41.818,43.707,42.659,39.179)⊤ that is consistent with the
one reported in those papers.
Listing 3: Implementation of the NEP (4) within GAMS/EMP
1 sets i agents / 1∗5 /;
2 alias(i,j);
4 parameters c(i) / 1 10, 2 8, 3 6, 4 4, 5 2 /,
5 K(i) / 1 5, 2 5, 3 5, 4 5, 5 5 /,
6 beta(i) / 1 1.2, 2 1.1, 3 1.0, 4 0.9, 5 0.8 /;
8 variables obj(i);
9 positive variables q(i);
11 equations objdef(i);
13 objdef(i)..
14 obj(i) =e= q(i)∗5000∗∗(1.0/1.1)∗sum(j, q(j))∗∗(−1.0/1.1) − (c(i)∗q(i) + beta(i)/(beta
(i)+1)∗K(i)∗∗(−1/beta(i))∗q(i)∗∗((beta(i)+1)/beta(i)));
16 model nep / objdef /;
18 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
19 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
20 loop(i,
21 put ’max’, obj(i), q(i), objdef(i) /;
22 );
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23 putclose empinfo;
25 q.l(i) = 10;
26 solve nep using emp;
3.2.2 GNEP
We use the following GNEP example derived from the QVI example of [23, page 14]:
find (x∗1,x
∗
2) satisfying,
x∗1 ∈ argmin
0≤x1≤11
x21+
8
3
x1x
∗
2−
100
3
x1,
subject to x1+ x
∗
2 ≤ 15,
x∗2 ∈ argmin
0≤x2≤11
x22+
5
4
x∗1x2− 22.5x2,
subject to x∗1+ x2 ≤ 20.
(5)
In (5), each agent solves a strongly convex optimization problem. Not only the objective functions but
also the feasible region of each agent is affected by other agent’s decision. Hence it is a GNEP. Listing 4
shows an implementation of (5) within GAMS/EMP. Our model has computed a solution (x∗1,x
∗
2) = (10,5)
that is consistent with the one reported in [23]. In Section 6.2, we show that (5) can be equivalently formu-
lated as a QVI using our extension to the EMP framework.
Listing 4: Implementation of the GNEP (5) within GAMS/EMP
1 set i / 1∗2 /;
2 alias(i,j);
4 variable obj(i);
5 positive variable x(i);
7 equation defobj(i), cons(i);
9 defobj(i)..
10 obj(i) =E=
11 (sqr(x(i)) + 8/3∗x(i)∗x(’2’) − 100/3∗x(i))$(i.val eq 1) +
12 (sqr(x(i)) + 5/4∗x(’1’)∗x(i) − 22.5∗x(i))$(i.val eq 2);
14 cons(i)..
15 sum(j, x(j)) =L= 15$(i.val eq 1) + 20$(i.val eq 2);
17 x.up(i) = 11;
19 model gnep / defobj, cons /;
21 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
22 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
23 loop(i,
24 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), defobj(i), cons(i) /;
25 );
26 putclose empinfo;
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28 solve gnep using emp;
3.2.3 MOPEC
We present a general equilibrium example in economics [20, Section 3] andmodel it as aMOPEC.While [20]
formulated the problem as a complementarity problem by using the closed form of the utility maximizing
demand function, we formulate it as a MOPEC by explicitly introducing a utility-maximizing optimization
agent (the consumer) to compute the demand.
Let us briefly explain the general equilibrium problem we consider. We use the notations and explanation
from [20]. There are three types of agents: i) profit-maximizing producers; ii) utility-maximizing consumers;
iii) a market determining the price of commodities based on production and demand. The problem is given
with a technologymatrix A, an initial endowment b, and the demand function d(p). The coefficient ai j > 0 (or
ai j < 0) of A indicates output (or input) of commodity i for each unit activity of producer j. For a given price
p, d(p) is the demand of consumers maximizing their utilities within their budgets, where budgets depend
on the price p and initial endowment b. Assuming that y,x, and p represent activity of producers, demands
of consumers, and prices of commodities, respectively, we say that (y∗,x∗, p∗) is a general equilibrium if it
satisfies the following:
No positive profit for each activity −A⊤p∗ ≥ 0,
No excess demand b+Ay∗− x∗ ≥ 0,
Nonnegativity p∗ ≥ 0,y∗ ≥ 0,
No activity for earning negative profit (−A⊤p∗)⊤y∗ = 0,
and positive activity implies balanced profit,
Zero price for excess supply p∗⊤(b+Ay∗− x∗) = 0,
and market clearance for positive price,
Utility maximizing demand x∗ ∈ argmax
x
utility(x),
subject to p∗⊤x≤ p∗⊤b.
(6)
We consider a market where there are a single producer, a single consumer, and three commodities. To
compute the demand function without using its closed form, we introduce a utility-maximizing consumer
explicitly in the model. Our GAMS/EMP model finds a solution y∗ = 3,x∗ = (3,2,0)⊤, p∗ = (6,1,5)⊤ for
α = 0.9 that is consistent with the one in [20].
Listing 5: Implementation of the MOPEC within GAMS/EMP
1 set i commodities / 1∗3 /;
3 parameters ATmat(i) technology matrix / 1 1 , 2 −1 , 3 −1 /,
4 s(i) budget share / 1 0.9, 2 0.1, 3 0 /,
5 b(i) endowment / 1 0 , 2 5 , 3 3 /;
7 variable u utility of the consumer;
8 positive variables y activity of the producer,
9 x(i) Marshallian demand of the consumer,
10 p(i) prices;
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12 equations mkt(i) constraint on excess demand,
13 profit profit of activity,
14 udef Cobb−Douglas utility function,
15 budget budget constraint;
17 mkt(i)..
18 b(i) + ATmat(i)∗y − x(i) =G= 0;
20 profit..
21 sum(i, −ATmat(i)∗p(i)) =G= 0;
23 udef..
24 u =E= sum(i, s(i)∗log(x(i)));
26 budget..
27 sum(i, p(i)∗x(i)) =L= sum(i, p(i)∗b(i));
29 model mopec / mkt, profit, udef, budget /;
31 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
32 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
33 put ’max’, u, ’x’, udef, budget /;
34 ∗ We have mkt perp p and profit perp y, the fourth and fifth conditions of (6).
35 put ’vi mkt p profit y’ /;
36 putclose empinfo;
38 ∗ The second commodity is used as a numeraire.
39 p.fx(’2’) = 1;
40 x.l(i) = 1;
42 solve mopec using emp;
4 Modeling equilibrium problems with shared constraints
This section describes our first extension to model shared constraints and to compute different types of
solutions associated with them.
4.1 Shared constraints and limitations of the existing framework
We first define shared constraints in equilibrium problems, specifically when they are explicitly given as
equalities or inequalities.
Definition 1 In equilibrium problems, if the same constraint, given explicitly as an equality or an inequality,
appears multiple times in different agents’ problem definitions, then it is a shared constraint.
For example, a constraint h(x) ≤ 0 (with no subscript i on h) is a shared constraint in the following
GNEP:
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Example 1 Find (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N) satisfying
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi
fi(xi,x
∗
−i),
subject to gi(xi,x
∗
−i)≤ 0,
h(xi,x
∗
−i)≤ 0, for i= 1, . . . ,N.
Our definition of a shared constraint allows each agent’s feasible region to be defined with a combination
of shared and non-shared constraints. Our definition subsumes the cases in [8,9], where each agent’s feasible
region is defined by the shared constraint only: in that situation there are no gi(x)’s. In our framework, the
shared constraint can also be defined over some subset of agents. For expository ease throughout this section,
we use Example 1, but the extension to the more general setting is straightforward.
Shared constraints are mainly used to model shared resources among agents. In the tragedy of commons
example [22, Section 1.1.2], agents share a capped channel formulated as a shared constraint ∑Ni=1 xi ≤ 1.
Another example is the river basin pollution game in [16,18], where the total amount of pollutant thrown in
the river by the agents is restricted. The environmental constraints are shared constraints in this case. More
details on how we model these examples can be found in Section 4.3.
There are two types of solutions when shared constraints are present. Assume a suitable constraint quali-
fication holds for each solution x∗ of Example 1. Let µ∗i be a multiplier associated with the shared constraint
h(x) for agent i at the solution x∗. If µ∗1 = · · ·= µ
∗
N , then we call the solution a variational equilibrium. The
name of the solution stems from the fact that if there are no gi(x)’s, then x
∗ is a solution to the VI(X ,F) and
vice versa by Proposition 2, where X = {x ∈Rn | h(x)≤ 0} and h is a convex function. In all other cases, we
call a solution a GNEP equilibrium.
An interpretation from the economics point of view is that, at a variational equilibrium, agents have the
same marginal value on the resources associated with the shared constraint (as the multiplier values are the
same), whereas at a GNEP equilibrium each agent may have a different marginal value.
A shared constraint may not be easily modeled using the existing EMP framework. As each equation
must be assigned to a single agent, we currently need to create a replica of the shared constraint for each
agent. For Example 1, we may model it within GAMS/EMP as follows:
Listing 6: Modeling the GNEP equilibrium via replications
1 variables obj(i), x(i);
2 equations deff(i), defg(i), defh(i);
4 model gnep shared / deff, defg, defh /;
6 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
7 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
8 loop(i,
9 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), deff(i), defg(i), defh(i) /;
10 );
11 putclose empinfo;
In Listing 6, each defh(i) is defined exactly in the sameway for all i= 1, . . . ,N: each of them is a replica
of the same equation. This approach is neither natural nor intuitive compared to its algebraic formulation.
It is also difficult to tell if the equation defh is a shared constraint by just reading the empinfo file. The
information that defh is a shared constraint is lost. This could potentially prevent applying specialized
solution methods, such as the one in [27], for shared constraints.
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Another difficulty lies in modeling the variational equilibrium. To compute it, we need to have the mul-
tipliers associated with the shared constraints the same among the agents. Additional constraints may be
required for such conditions to hold; there is no easy way to force equality without changing the model
using the existing EMP framework.
4.2 Extensions to model shared constraints
Our extensions have two new features: i) we provide a syntactic enhancement that enables shared constraints
to be naturally and succinctly specified in a similar way to the algebraic formulation; ii) we define a new
EMP keyword that enables switching between the GNEP and variational equilibrium without modifying
each agent’s problem definition.
To implement shared constraints, we modify Assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 2 A model of an equilibrium problem described by equations and variables is assumed to have
the following properties in the empinfo file:
– Each objective or VI function of the model is owned by a single agent.
– Each constraint of the model is owned by at least one agent. If a constraint appears multiple times in
different agents’ problem definitions, then it is regarded as a shared constraint, and it is owned by these
agents.
– Each variable is owned by a single agent.
Using Assumption 2, we define shared constraints by placing the same constraint in multiple agents’
problems. For example, we can model Example 1 without replications by changing lines 2 and 8-10 of
Listing 6 into the following:
Listing 7: Modeling a shared constraint using a single copy
1 equation deff(i), defg(i), defh;
3 loop(i,
4 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), deff(i), defg(i), defh /;
5 );
In Listing 7, a single instance of an equation, defh, representing the shared constraint h(x)≤ 0 is created
and placed in each agent’s problem description. Our framework then recognizes it as a shared constraint.
This is exactly the same way as its algebraic formulation is specified. Also the empinfo file does not lose
the problem structure: we can easily identify that defh is a shared constraint by reading the file as it appears
multiple times. To allow shared constraints, we need to specify SharedEqu in the option file jams.opt.
Otherwise, multiple occurrences of the same constraint are regarded as an error. This is simply a safety
check to stop non-expert users creating incorrect models.
In addition to the syntactic extension, we define a new EMP keyword visol to compute a variational
equilibrium associated with shared constraints. By default, a GNEP equilibrium is computed if no visol
keyword is specified. Hence Listing 7 computes a GNEP equilibrium. If we place the following line in
the empinfo file before the agents’ problem descriptions begin, that is, before line 3 in Listing 7, then
a variational equilibrium is computed. The keyword visol is followed by a list of shared constraints for
which each agent owning the constraint must use the same multiplier.
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Listing 8: Computing a variational equilibrium
1 put ’visol defh’ /;
Depending on the solution type requested, our framework creates different MCPs. For a GNEP equilib-
rium, the framework replicates the shared constraint and assigns a separate multiplier for each agent owning
it. For Example 1, the following MCP(z,F) is generated:
F(z) = ((Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1)
⊤, z= ((z⊤i )
N
i=1)
⊤,
Fi(z) =

∇xi fi(x)−∇xigi(x)λi−∇xih(x)µigi(x)
h(x)

 , zi =

 xiλi ≤ 0
µi ≤ 0

 , for i= 1, . . . ,N. (7)
Note that the same equation h(·) is replicated, and a separate multiplier µi is assigned in (7) for each agent i
for i= 1, . . . ,N.
If a variational equilibrium is requested, then our framework creates a single instance of the shared
constraint, and a single multiplier is used for that constraint among agents. Accordingly, we construct the
following MCP(z,F) for Example 1:
F(z) = ((Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1,Fh(z)
⊤)⊤, z= ((z⊤i )
N
i=1,z
⊤
h )
⊤,
Fi(z) =
[
∇xi fi(x)−∇xigi(x)λi−∇xih(x)µ
gi(x)
]
, zi =
[
xi
λi ≤ 0
]
, for i= 1, . . . ,N,
Fh(z) =
[
h(x)
]
, zh =
[
µ ≤ 0
]
.
(8)
In (8), a single multiplier µ is assigned to the shared constraint h(x), and h(x) appears only once in the
MCP. If there are no gi(x)’s, then with a constraint qualification the problem exactly corresponds to VI(X ,F)
of Proposition 2 with the set X defined as X := {x | h(x)≤ 0}.
4.3 Examples
We present two GNEP examples having shared constraints in the following sections, respectively. The first
example has a unique solution that is a variational equilibrium. Thus, with or without the visol keyword,
our framework computes the same solution. In the second example, multiple solutions exist. Our framework
computes solutions of different types depending on the existence of the visol keyword in this case.
4.3.1 GNEP with a shared constraint: tragedy of the commons
We consider the tragedy of the commons example [22, Section 1.1.2]:
find (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N) satisfying,
x∗i ∈ argmax
0≤xi≤1
xi
(
1−
(
xi+
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
x∗j
))
,
subject to xi+
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
x∗j ≤ 1.
(9)
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There is a shared channel with capacity 1, represented as a shared constraint ∑Nj=1 x j ≤ 1, through which
each agent i sends xi units of flow. The value agent i obtains by sending xi units is xi
(
1−∑Nj=1 x j
)
, and each
agent tries to maximize its value. By the form of the problem, (9) is a GNEP with a shared constraint.
The problem has a unique equilibrium x∗i = 1/(N + 1) for i = 1, . . . ,N. The value of agent i is then
1/(N+ 1)2, and the total value over all agents is N/(N+ 1)2 ≈ 1/N. As noted in [22], if agents choose to
use ∑Ni=1 xi = 1/2, then the total value will be 1/4 which is much larger than 1/N for large enough N. This is
why the problem is called the tragedy of the commons.
We model (9) within GAMS/EMP in Listing 9. A single constraint cap is defined for the shared con-
straint, and the same equation cap appears in each agent’s problem definition in the empinfo file.
Listing 9: Implementation of the GNEP (9) within GAMS/EMP
1 $if not set N $set N 5
3 set i / 1∗%N% /;
4 alias(i,j);
6 variables obj(i);
7 positive variables x(i);
9 equations defobj(i), cap;
11 defobj(i)..
12 obj(i) =E= x(i)∗(1 − sum(j, x(j)));
14 cap..
15 sum(i, x(i)) =L= 1;
17 model m / defobj, cap /;
19 file info / ’%emp.info%’ /;
20 put info ’equilibrium’ /;
21 loop(i,
22 put ’max’, obj(i), x(i), defobj(i), cap /;
23 );
24 putclose;
26 x.up(i) = 1;
28 ∗ Specify SharedEqu option in the jams.opt file to allow shared constraints.
29 $echo SharedEqu > jams.opt
30 m.optfile = 1;
32 solve m using emp;
By default, a GNEP equilibrium is computed. If we want to compute a variational equilibrium, we just
need to place the following line right after line 20 in Listing 9.
1 put ’visol cap’ /;
As the solution is unique x∗i = 1/(N+1)with multiplier µ
∗
i = 0 for i= 1, . . . ,N, our framework computes
the same solution in both cases.
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4.3.2 GNEP with shared constraints: river basin pollution game
We present another example where we have different solutions for GNEP and variational equilibria. The
example is the river basin example [16,18] described below:
find (x∗1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3) satisfying,
x∗i ∈ argmin
xi≥0
(c1i+ c2ixi)xi−
(
d1− d2
(
3
∑
j=1, j 6=i
x∗j + xi
))
xi,
subject to
3
∑
j=1, j 6=i
(
u jme jx
∗
j
)
+ uimeixi ≤ Km,
for m= 1,2, i= 1,2,3,
where (c,d,e,u,K) is problem data.
(10)
It has two shared constraints, and they are shared by all the three agents.
Let us briefly explain the model. There are three agents near a river, each of which pursues maximum
profit by producing some commodities. The term (c1i+ c2ixi)xi denotes the total cost of agent i, and (d1−
d2(∑
3
j=1, j 6=i x
∗
j + xi))xi is the revenue. Each agent can throw pollutant in the river, but its amount is limited
by the two shared constraints in (10).
Listing 10 shows an implementation of (10) within GAMS/EMP. The two shared constraints are repre-
sented in the equations cons(m). We first compute a variational equilibrium. A solution computed by our
framework is x∗ = (21.145,16.028,2.726)with multipliers µ∗cons1 = −0.574 and µ
∗
cons2 = 0 for the shared
constraints cons(’1’) and cons(’2’), respectively.1
If we compute a GNEP equilibrium by deleting line 40 in Listing 10, then we find a solution x∗ =
(0,6.473,22.281). In this case, multiplier values associated with the shared constraints for each agent are as
follows:
µ∗cons1,1 =−0.804, µ
∗
cons1,2 =−1.504, µ
∗
cons1,3 =−0.459,
µ∗cons2,1 = µ
∗
cons2,2 = µ
∗
cons2,3 = 0
Listing 10: Implementation of (10) within GAMS/EMP
1 sets i / 1∗3 /
2 m / 1∗2 /;
3 alias(i,j);
5 parameters
6 K(m) / 1 100, 2 100 /
7 d1 / 3 /
8 d2 / 0.01 /
9 e(i) / 1 0.5, 2 0.25, 3 0.75 /;
11 table c(m,i)
12 1 2 3
13 1 0.1 0.12 0.15
14 2 0.01 0.05 0.01;
16 table u(i,m)
1 Note that we used the vector form for the constraints when we declare the equation cons for each agent in the empinfo file so that
we do not have to loop through the set m.
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17 1 2
18 1 6.5 4.583
19 2 5.0 6.250
20 3 5.5 3.750;
22 variables obj(i);
23 positive variables x(i);
25 equations
26 objdef(i)
27 cons(m);
29 objdef(i)..
30 obj(i) =E= (c(’1’,i) + c(’2’,i)∗x(i))∗x(i) − (d1 − d2∗sum(j, x(j)))∗x(i);
32 cons(m)..
33 sum(i, u(i,m)∗e(i)∗x(i)) =L= K(m);
35 model m shared / objdef, cons /;
37 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
38 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
39 ∗ Comment out the following line to compute a GNEP equilibrium.
40 put ’visol cons’ /;
41 loop(i,
42 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), objdef(i), ’cons’ /;
43 );
44 putclose empinfo;
46 $echo SharedEqu > jams.opt
47 m shared.optfile = 1;
49 solve m shared using emp;
51 ∗ Uncomment the code below to retrieve multipliers when a GNEP solution is computed.
52 ∗ parameters cons m(m,i);
53 ∗ execute load ’%gams.scrdir%/ugdx.dat’, cons m=cons;
Note that since we only have a single constraint cons in the modeling system, the lines 51-53 show how
to recover a multiplier value for each agent owning the shared constraint.
5 Modeling equilibrium problems using shared variables
In this section, we introduce implicit variables and their uses as shared variables. Roughly speaking, the
values of implicit variables are implicitly defined by other variable values. Shared variables are implicit
variables whose values are shared by multiple agents. For example, state variables controlled by multiple
agents in economics, but that need to have the same values across the problem, could be shared variables. In
this case, our framework allows a single variable to represent such shared variables. This not only improves
clarity of the model and facilitates deployment of differentmixed behaviormodels, but also provides a way of
significantly improving performancewith efficient formulations. In Section 5.1, implicit variables and shared
variables are defined. Section 5.2 presents various MCP formulations for them. Finally, in Section 5.3, we
present examples of using shared variables and experimental results comparing various MCP formulations.
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5.1 Implicit variables and shared variables
Definition 2 We call a variable y an implicit variable if for each x there is at most one y satisfying (y,x) ∈ X .
Here the set X is called the defining constraint of variable y.
Note that Definition 2 is not associated directly with equilibrium problems. It states that there exists one
and only one implicit function g(·) such that (g(x),x) ∈ X . A simple example is X = {(y,x) | y = ∑ni=1 xi}.
We do not check for uniqueness however. Our current implementation only allows the defining constraint X
to be represented as a system of equations and the implicit variable y to be declared as a free variable. They
also need to be of the same size. Constraints including bounds on variable y can be introduced by explicitly
defining them in additional equations. This is for allowing different solution types discussed in Section 4 to
be associated with them.
Based on Definition 2, we define a shared variable.
Definition 3 In equilibrium problems, variables yi’s are shared variables if there is a set X such that
– The feasible region of agent i is given by
Ki(x−i) := {(yi,xi) ∈ R
ny×ni | (yi,xi) ∈ Xi(x−i),(yi,xi,x−i) ∈ X}, for i= 1, . . . ,N. (11)
– yi’s are implicit variables with the same defining constraint X .
Basically, shared variables are implicit variables with an additional condition that they have the same
defining constraint. One can easily verify that if (y1, . . . ,yN ,x) ∈ K(x) := ∏
N
i=1Ki(x−i), then y1 = · · · = yN ,
that is, variables yi’s share their values. An extension to the case where they are shared by some subset of
agents is straightforward.
An equilibrium where shared variables yi’s are present is defined as follows:
find (y∗,x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N ,x
∗
N+1) satisfying,
(y∗,x∗i ) ∈ argmin
(y,xi)∈Ki(x
∗
−i)
fi(y,xi,x
∗
−i), for i= 1, . . . ,N,
x∗N+1 ∈ SOL(KN+1(x
∗
−(N+1)),F(·,x
∗
−(N+1))).
(12)
Example 2 presents the use of a shared variable assuming that y is an implicit variable with its defining
constraint X := {(y,x) | H(y,x) = 0}.
Example 2 The variable y is a shared variable of the following equilibrium problem:
find (y∗,x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N) satisfying,
(y∗,x∗i ) ∈ argmin
y,xi
fi(y,xi,x
∗
−i),
subject to H(y,xi,x
∗
−i) = 0, for i= 1, . . . ,N,
where H : Rm+n →Rm,y ∈ Rm
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Listing 11 presents GAMS code to model Example 2. We introduce a new keyword implicit to declare
an implicit variable and its defining constraint. The implicit keyword is followed by a list of variables and
constraints, and our framework augments them to form a single vector of implicit variables and its defining
constraint. It is required that the keyword should come first before any agent’s problem definition. We can
identify that y is a shared variable in this case as it appears multiple times in agents’ problem definitions.
As the defining equation is assumed to belong to the implicit variable, we do not place H in each agent’s
problem definition (informally the variable y owns H).
Listing 11: Modeling a shared variable
1 variables obj(i), x(i), y;
2 equations deff(i), defH;
4 model shared implicit / deff, defH /;
6 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
7 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
8 put ’implicit y defH’ /;
9 loop(i,
10 put ’min’, obj(i), x(i), y, deff(i) /;
11 );
12 putclose empinfo;
Bounds on the shared variables can be introduced by explicitly defining them in additional equations.
These bounds could change feasible region hence solutions of the problem. For example, the following
two-agent problem, each of which minimizes its total cost, has bounds on the shared variable y, and its
solution changes as the value of the upper bound b varies. An implementation of (13) is available at [7]. Our
framework computes (x∗1,x
∗
2) = (b/2,b/2) for b≤ 12 and (x
∗
1,x
∗
2) = (6,6) for b> 12.
find (y∗,x∗1,x
∗
2) satisfying,
(y∗,x∗i ) ∈ argmin
xi≥0,y
xi− xi(10− 0.5 ∗ y),
subject to y= xi+ x
∗
−i,
0≤ y≤ b, for i= 1,2.
(13)
As we now allow shared variables, Assumption 2 needs to be modified as follows:
Assumption 3 A model of an equilibrium problem described by equations and variables is assumed to have
the following properties in the empinfo file:
– Each VI function of the model is owned by a single agent. Each objective function of the model is owned
by at least one agent. The objective function can be owned by multiple agents when its objective variable
is declared as an implicit variable.
– Each constraint of the model is owned by at least one agent. If a constraint appears multiple times in
different agents’ problem definitions, then it is regarded as a shared constraint owned by these agents.
– Each variable of the model is owned by at least one agent except for an implicit variable. If a variable
appears multiple times in different agents’ problem definition, then it is regarded as a shared variable
owned by these agents, and it must be an implicit variable. If there is a variable not owned by any agent,
then it must be an implicit variable.
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Note that in Assumption 3 we allowmissing ownership for an implicit variable as its value is well-defined
via its defining constraint once the values of other variables are set. When the ownership is not specified for
an implicit variable, our framework creates a VI agent that owns the variable and its defining constraint: H
becomes a VI function, and y is its matching variable in Example 2. This turns out to be especially useful to
model mixed behavior as described in Section 5.3.3.
5.2 Various MCP formulations for shared variables
This section describes various MCP formulations for shared variables. For clarity, we will use Example 2
to demonstrate our formulations throughout this section. Each formulation in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.3 shares
the same GAMS code of Listing 11. Different formulations can be obtained by specifying an appropriate
value for the option ImplVarModel in the file jams.opt. In Section 5.3, we present experimental results
comparing the sizes and performance of these formulations.
5.2.1 Replicating shared variables for each agent
In this reformulation, we replicate each shared variable for each agent owning it and compute the corre-
sponding MCP. For Example 2, our framework creates a variable yi for agent i, that is a replication of
variable y, then computes the KKT conditions. The following MCP(z,F) is formulated by collecting these
KKT conditions:
F(z) =
[
(Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1
]⊤
, z=
[
(z⊤i )
N
i=1
]⊤
,
Fi(z) =

∇xi fi(x,y)− (∇xiH(y,x))µi∇yi fi(x,y)− (∇yiH(y,x))µi
H(yi,x)

 , zi =

xiyi
µi

 . (14)
The size of (14) is (n+ 2mN) where the first term is from n = ∑Ni=1 |xi| and the second one is from
N × (|yi|+ |µi|) with |yi| = |µi| = m for each i = 1, . . . ,N. Note that the same constraints H and shared
variable y are replicated N times. Table 1 summarizes the sizes of the MCP formulations depending on the
strategy. (14) can be obtained by specifying an option ImplVarModel=Replication in jams.opt.
5.2.2 Switching shared variables with multipliers
We introduce a switching strategy that does not require replications. The switching strategy uses the fact
that in an MCP we can exchange free variables of the same size in the complementarity conditions without
changing solutions. For example, if an MCP is given by[
F1(z)
F2(z)
]
⊥
[
z1
z2
]
,
where zi’s are free variables, then a solution to the MCP is a solution to the following MCP and vice versa:[
F1(z)
F2(z)
]
⊥
[
z2
z1
]
.
Applying the switching technique to shared variables, we switch each shared variable with the multipliers
associated with its defining equations. This is possible bec
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Strategy Size of the MCP
replication (n+2mN)
switching (n+mN+m)
substitution (implicit) (n+nm+m)
substitution (explicit) (n+m)
Table 1: The size of the MCPs containing shared variables of Example 2
defining equations are of the same size as the shared variable. As a by-product, we do not have to replicate
the shared variables and their defining constraints. Thus we can reduce the size of the resultant MCP.
The MCP(z,F) obtained by applying the switching technique to Example 2 is as follows:
F(z) =
[
(Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1,Fh(z)
⊤
]⊤
, z=
[
(z⊤i )
N
i=1,z
⊤
h
]⊤
,
Fi(z) =
[
∇xi fi(x,y)− (∇xiH(y,x))µi
∇y fi(x,y)− (∇yH(y,x))µi
]
, zi =
[
xi
µi
]
,
Fh(z) =
[
H(y,x)
]
, zh =
[
y
]
.
(15)
The size of (15) is (n+mN +m). Note that compared to the replication strategy the size is reduced
by (N − 1)m. The number (N − 1)m exactly corresponds to the number of additional replications of the
shared variable y. The formulation can be obtained by specifying an option ImplVarModel=Switching in
jams.opt. This is currently the default value for ImplVarModel.
5.2.3 Substituting out multipliers
We can apply our last strategy when the implicit function theorem holds for the defining constraints. By
the implicit function theorem, we mean for (y¯, x¯) satisfying H(y¯, x¯) = 0 there exists a unique continuously
differentiable function h : Rn → Rm that maps into some neighborhood of y¯ such that H(h(x),x) = 0 for all
x in some neighborhood of x¯.
In a single optimization problem with H taking the special form, H(y,x) = y− h(x), a similar definition
was made in the AMPL modeling system, and the variable y is called a defined variable in this case [12, See
A.8.1].
The basic idea is to regard the shared variable y as a function of other non-shared variables and apply the
total derivative. At each solution (y∗,x∗) of the problem, there exists a locally defined implicit function hx∗(x)
such that y∗ = hx∗(x
∗) and H(hx∗(x),x) = 0 for each x in some neighborhood of x
∗ by the implicit function
theorem. We can then remove variable y by replacing it with the implicit function hx∗(x) near (y
∗,x∗). Thus
the objective function fi(xi,x−i,y) of agent i on the feasible set H(y,x) = 0 near (y
∗,x∗) can be equivalently
represented as fi(xi,x−i,hx∗(x)). Consequently, the KKT conditions near (y
∗,x∗) only involve variable x:
d
dxi
fi(xi,x−i,hx∗(x)) = ∇xi fi(xi,x−i,hx∗(x))+∇xihx∗(x)∇y fi(xi,x−i,hx∗(x)),
y= hx∗(x),
where d/dxi represents the total derivative with respect to variable xi.
By the implicit function theorem, we have
∇xihx∗(x) =−∇xiH(y,x)∇yH(y,x)
−1.
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Therefore the KKT conditions of agent i’s problem of Example 2 can be represented as follows:
0= ∇xi fi−∇xiH(∇yH)
−1∇y fi ⊥ xi free, for i= 1, . . . ,N,
0= H(y,x) ⊥ y free,
(16)
where we also applied the switching technique in Section 5.2.2.
We can derive the same formulation (16) from another perspective. At a solution (y∗,x∗,µ∗) to the
problem, the matrix ∇yH(y
∗,x∗) is non-singular by the implicit function theorem. Thus we have
0= ∇y fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i,y
∗)− (∇yH(y
∗,x∗))µ∗i =⇒ µ
∗
i = (∇yH(y
∗,x∗))−1∇y fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i,y
∗). (17)
We can then substitute out every occurrence of µi by the right-hand side of (17) and remove the left-hand
side from consideration. The result is the formulation (16).
A critical issue with applying the formulation (16) is that in general we do not have the explicit alge-
braic representation of (∇yH)
−1. Computing it explicitly may be quite expensive and could cause numerical
issues.
Instead of explicitly computing it, we introduce new variablesΛi to replace ∇xiH(∇yH)
−1 with a system
of equations:
Λi∇yH(y,x) = ∇xiH(y,x), for i= 1, . . . ,N.
One can easily verify that for each solution (y∗,x∗) to (16) there exists Λ∗i satisfying the following and vice
versa:
0= ∇xi fi−Λi∇y fi ⊥ xi free,
0= Λi∇yH−∇xiH ⊥ Λi free, for i= 1, . . . ,N
0= H(y,x) ⊥ y free.
(18)
Consequently, the following MCP(z,F) is formulated in this case:
F(z) =
[
(Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1,Fh(z)
⊤
]⊤
, z=
[
(z⊤i )
N
i=1,z
⊤
h
]⊤
,
Fi(z) =
[
∇xi fi(x,y)−Λi∇y fi(x,y)
Λi∇yH(y,x)−∇xiH(y,x)
]
, zi =
[
xi
Λi
]
,
Fh(z) =
[
H(y,x)
]
, zh =
[
y
]
.
(19)
The size of (19) is (n+mn+m). This could be much larger than the one obtained when we apply
the switching strategy, whose size is (n+mN+m), because we usually have n≫ N. Comparing the size
to the case where we replicate the implicit variables, we have (n+ nm+m) ≤ (n+ 2mN) if and only if
N ≥ (n+ 1)/2.
The size of the substitution strategy can be significantly reduced when the shared variable is explicitly
defined, that is, H(y,x) = y− h(x). In this case, the algebraic representation of (∇yH)
−1 is in a favorable
form: an identity matrix. We do not have to introduce new variables and their corresponding system of
equations. As we know the explicit algebraic formulation of ∇xiH, the following MCP is formulated:
F(z) =
[
(Fi(z)
⊤)Ni=1,Fh(z)
⊤
]⊤
, z=
[
(z⊤i )
N
i=1,z
⊤
h
]⊤
,
Fi(z) =
[
∇xi fi(x,y)−∇xiH(y,x)∇y fi(x,y)
]
, zi =
[
xi
]
,
Fh(z) =
[
H(y,x)
]
, zh =
[
y
]
.
(20)
Note that the size of (20) is (n+m). This is a huge saving compared to other formulations. Our frame-
work automatically detects if a shared variable is given in the explicit form and substitutes out the mul-
tipliers if it is. Otherwise, (19) is formulated. The formulation can be obtained by specifying an option
ImplVarModel=Substitution in jams.opt.
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5.3 Examples
In this section, we introduce three models that use shared variables. Section 5.3.1 describes an example
where we can reduce its density significantly by introducing a shared variable. This enables the problem,
previously known as computationally intractable, to be efficiently solved. Section 5.3.2 presents an EPEC
model where each agent tries to maximize its welfare in the Nash way while trading goods with other agents
subject to general equilibrium conditions. The general equilibrium conditions define a set of state variables
that are shared by all agents. We can then use the constructs for shared variables to define the state variables.
In Section 5.3.3, we present an example of modeling mixed pricing behavior of agents. More examples on
using shared variables, for examplemodeling shared objective functions, can be found at [7]. All experiments
were performed on a Linux machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3340MCPU@2.70 GHz processor and 8GB
of memory. PATH was set to use the UMFPACK [5] as its basis computation engine.
5.3.1 Improving sparsity using a shared variable
We consider an oligopolistic energy market equilibrium example [19, Section 4] formulated as a GNEP.
We show that its sparsity can be significantly improved by introducing a shared variable, which makes the
problem, known as computationally intractable in [19], solvable. The example is defined as follows:
find (q∗0,q
∗
1, . . . ,q
∗
5) satisfying,
q∗0 ∈ argmax
0≤q0≤U0
p
(
5
∑
i=1
ni
∑
k=1
q∗ik
)(
5
∑
i=1
ni
∑
k=1
q∗ik
)
−
5
∑
i=1
ci(q
∗
i )−Pq0,
subject to q0+
5
∑
i=1
ni
∑
k=1
q∗ik = d,
q∗i ∈ argmax
0≤qi≤Ui
p
(
5
∑
j=1, j 6=i
n j
∑
k=1
q∗jk+
ni
∑
k=1
qik
)(
ni
∑
k=1
qik
)
− ci(qi),
subject to q∗0+
5
∑
j=1, j 6=i
n j
∑
k=1
q∗jk+
ni
∑
k=1
qik = d,
where ci(qi) =
1
2
q⊤i Miqi+ b
⊤
i qi,
p(Q) :=
(
−P
(1.5d)2
Q2+P
)
,
(P,d,Mi,bi,Ui,ni) is problem data, for i= 1, . . . ,5.
(21)
Let us briefly describe (21). There are six agents. The first agent is an ISO agent which controls variable
q0 ∈ R measuring deficit of energy. It tries to maximize the total profit of all the energy supplying agents
less the penalty caused by being unable to meet the fixed demand d. The parameter P represents how much
penalty we put on the deficit q0. Each agent i, controlling qi = (qi1, . . . ,qini) for i = 1, . . . ,5, is a profit-
maximizing agent that produces homogeneous energy generated from its ni number of plants. Its decision
variable qik denotes the amount of energy produced from its kth plant for k = 1, . . . ,ni. The function p(Q)
is a concave inverse demand function, and ci(qi) is the total cost of producing energy ∑
ni
k=1 qik. The matrix
Mi is a diagonal matrix having positive diagonal entries, hence ci(·) is a strongly convex function. All the
six agents share the same demand constraint q0+∑
5
i=1 ∑
ni
k=1 qik = d; it is a shared constraint. We use n,
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n = ∑5i=1 ni, to denote the total number of plants, and each energy-producing agent has the same number of
plants, ni = n/5 for i= 1, . . . ,5.
In [19], a variational equilibrium was computed by formulating a VI and solving it using PATH. The
paper reported that PATH started to get much slower for the problem of size n = 2,500, and it was not able
to solve problems of sizes n= 5,000 and n= 10,000 due to out of memory error.
We have observed that the memory error was due to the high density of the Jacobian matrix of the
MCP: it was almost 100% for all problems. Consequently, the MCP will have a large number of nonzero
entries requiring a huge amount of memory. Also the linear algebra computation (required by PATH for basis
computations) time will be much slower in this case.
The root cause of such a highly dense Jacobian matrix was because of the term ∑5i=1 ∑
ni
k=1 qik in the
price function p(·): for each qik, the term ∂ p(·)/∂qik has all the variables qi′k′ . We can make the problem
much sparser by introducing a shared variable z := ∑5i=1 ∑
ni
k=1 qik. Mathematically, the problem is defined as
follows:
find (z∗,q∗0,q
∗
1, . . . ,q
∗
5) satisfying,
q∗0 ∈ argmax
0≤q0≤U0
p(z∗)z∗−
5
∑
i=1
ci(q
∗
i )−Pq0,
subject to q0+ z
∗ = d,
(z∗,q∗i ) ∈ argmax
z,0≤qi≤Ui
p(z)
(
ni
∑
k=1
qik
)
− ci(qi),
subject to q∗0+ z= d,
z=
5
∑
j=1, j 6=i
n j
∑
k=1
q∗jk+
ni
∑
k=1
qik.
(22)
Listing 12 implements (22). We used the visol keyword to compute a variational equilibrium. We
formulate each agent’s problem as a minimization problem by flipping the sign of its objective function.
Therefore, each agent i’s objective function for i= 1, . . . ,5 is strongly convex, and the ISO agent’s objective
function is linear.
Listing 12: Implementation of (22) using a shared variable within GAMS/EMP
1 $if not set n $set n 100
2 $if not set num agents $set num agents 5
3 $eval num plants %n%/%num agents%
4 $set P 120
5 sets i / 1∗%num agents% /
6 k / 1∗%num plants% /;
7 alias(i,j);
9 variables iso obj, agent obj(i), z;
10 positive variables q0, q(i,k);
11 equations iso defobj, agent defobj(i), demand, defz;
12 parameters U0, U(i,k), M(i,k), b(i,k), d, a;
14 U0 = 5;
15 U(i,k) = uniform(0,10);
16 M(i,k) = uniform(0.4,0.8);
17 b(i,k) = uniform(30,60);
18 d = 0.8 ∗ sum((i,k), U(i,k));
19 a = −%P% / (1.5 ∗ d)∗∗2;
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21 q0.up = U0;
22 q.up(i,k) = U(i,k);
23 q.l(i,k) = 0.8∗U(i,k);
24 z.l = sum((i,k), q.l(i,k));
26 iso defobj..
27 iso obj =E= %P%∗q0
28 + sum(i, 0.5∗sum(k, M(i,k)∗q(i,k)∗q(i,k)) + sum(k, b(i,k)∗q(i,k)))
29 − (a∗sqr(z) + %P%)∗z;
31 agent defobj(i)..
32 agent obj(i) =E=
33 0.5∗sum(k, M(i,k)∗q(i,k)∗q(i,k)) + sum(k, b(i,k)∗q(i,k))
34 − (a∗sqr(z) + %P%)∗sum(k, q(i,k));
36 demand..
37 q0 + z =E= d;
39 defz..
40 z =E= sum((i,k), q(i,k));
42 model m oligop / iso defobj, agent defobj, demand, defz /;
44 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
45 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
46 put ’implicit z defz’ /;
47 put ’visol demand’ /;
48 put ’min’, iso obj, q0, iso defobj, demand /;
49 loop(i,
50 put ’min’, agent obj(i);
51 loop(k, put q(i,k););
52 put z, agent defobj(i), demand /;
53 );
54 putclose empinfo;
56 $echo SharedEqu > jams.opt
57 m oligop.optfile = 1;
59 solve m oligop using emp;
Table 2 describes the statistics and performance of (21) over various sizes of plants and agents.2 The
’-’ symbol represents that we were not able to obtain the results because of memory issue. In Tables 2(a)
and 2(b), we used the same setup as in [19]. First, note that the MCP size of the original formulation was
the smallest, but it had the highest density. This resulted in a computationally intractable model for large
n ≥ 10,000. In contrast, using a shared variable and the switching strategy, we were able to generate much
sparser models and consequently to solve all of them. However, the substitution strategy suffered a similar
issue: its high density generated computationally intractable models for n = 25,000 and 50,000. This was
due to the total derivative computation. The term ∑ik qik remained in each component of the MCP function
Fi ∈ R
ni for each agent i. This resulted in a block diagonal Jacobian matrix consisting of 5 100% dense
blocks of size ni× ni for i= 1, . . . ,5.
2 The replication strategy is not allowed in this case as it is ambiguous what variable to replicate for the ISO agent: the agent uses
shared variable z, but it does not own it. Our solver automatically detects this case and generates an error.
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n
Original Switching Substitution
Size Density (%) Size Density (%) Size Density (%)
2,500 2,502 99.92 2,508 0.20 2,503 20.07
5,000 5,002 99.96 5,008 0.10 5,003 20.04
10,000 10,002 99.98 10,008 0.05 10,003 20.02
25,000 - - 25,008 0.02 - -
50,000 - - 50,008 0.01 - -
(a) MCP model statistics when we have 1 ISO agent and 5 energy-producing agents
n
Original Switching Substitution
(Major,Minor) Time (secs) (Major,Minor) Time (secs) (Major,Minor) Time (secs)
2,500 (2,2639) 57.78 (1,2630) 1.30 (1,2630) 13.18
5,000 (2,5368) 420.92 (1,5353) 5.83 (1,5353) 91.01
10,000 - - (1,10517) 22.01 (1,10517) 652.03
25,000 - - (1,26408) 148.08 - -
50,000 - - (1,52946) 651.14 - -
(b) Performance comparison when we have 1 ISO agent and 5 energy-producing agents
n
Switching Substitution
Size Density (%) Size Density (%)
2,500 3,753 0.12 2,503 0.20
5,000 7,503 0.06 5,003 0.10
10,000 15,003 0.03 10,003 0.05
25,000 37,503 0.01 25,003 0.02
50,000 75,003 0.01 50,003 0.01
(c) MCP model statistics when we have 1 ISO agent and n/2 energy-producing agents
n
Switching Substitution
(Major,Minor) Time (secs) (Major,Minor) Time (secs)
2,500 (1,2650) 1.43 (1,2650) 0.88
5,000 (1,5359) 5.89 (1,5359) 3.61
10,000 (1,10526) 25.05 (1,10526) 15.70
25,000 (1,26400) 176.94 (1,26400) 107.45
50,000 (1,52950) 800.75 (1,52950) 471.51
(d) Performance comparison when we have 1 ISO agent and n/2 energy-producing agents
Table 2: Model statistics and performance comparison of (21) using PATH
To see the effect of many agents, we generated problems where each agent now has 2 plants. Thus for
a given n there are n/2 number of energy-producing agents. Tables 2(c) and 2(d) report the model statistics
and performance comparison of the switching and substitution strategies. We did not report experimental
results using the original formulation as the MCP size and the density of its Jacobian matrix were the same
as before. In this case, the substitution strategy showed the best performance. Its Jacobian matrix was still
block diagonal consisting of n/2 blocks, but each block size was just 2×2. This improved the sparsity of the
model significantly. The MCP size of the switching strategy was much larger than that of the substitution as
its size is proportional to the number of agents (see Table 1). This made the strategy two times slower than
the substitution strategy.
28 Youngdae Kim, Michael C. Ferris
# Agents
Replication Switching Substitution
Size Density (%) Size Density (%) Size Density (%)
5 570 1.66 350 3.34 1,230 0.77
10 2,290 0.72 1,300 1.70 10,210 0.14
15 5,160 0.50 2,850 1.28 35,190 0.06
20 9,180 0.40 5,000 1.10 84,420 0.03
23 12,144 0.37 6,578 1.03 129,030 0.02
# Agents
Replication Switching Substitution
(Major,Minor) Time (secs) (Major,Minor) Time (secs) (Major,Minor) Time (secs)
5 (18,164) 0.33 (18,173) 0.22 (11,29) 0.38
10 (17,279) 1.52 (17,301) 1.48 (15,436) 8.14
15 (8,22) 1.81 (8,22) 1.68 (129,19806) 814.73
20 (9,28) 4.90 (9,28) 4.73 (13,461) 104.00
23 (9,41) 10.07 (9,41) 8.02 (20,1451) 368.99
Table 3: MCP model statistics and performance comparison of the EPEC model
5.3.2 Modeling equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints
We construct an EPEC model3 where data was taken from the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) 9
database [1]. The model is an exchange model having 23 agents (countries) where each agent tries to max-
imize its welfare with respect to economic variables (equivalently, state variables) and its strategic policy
variables in the Nash way while trading goods with other agents subject to the general equilibrium condi-
tions. Mathematically, the model is represented as follows:
find (w∗,z∗, t∗) satisfying,
(w∗,z∗, t∗i ) ∈ argmax
w,z,ti∈Ti
wi,
subject to H(w,z, t) = 0,
for i= 1, . . . ,23,
(23)
wherewi is a welfare index variable of agent i, z is a vector of endogenous economic variables such as prices,
quantities, and so on, ti represents a vector of strategic policy variables of agent i that determines the tariffs
on the imports, and H(·) : R253×506 → R253 is a system of nonlinear equations that represents the general
equilibrium conditions.
A distinguishing feature of the model is that the state variables (w,z) are shared by the agents, and their
values are implicitly determined by the general equilibrium conditions. This implies that (w,z) are shared
variables, and the function H is their defining constraint. In this case, (w,z) are not given as an explicit
function of t in H.
In Table 3, we present experimental results of the three formulations over various problem sizes by
changing the number of agents. The size of H changes accordingly. We use the replication strategy as a
baseline to compare the size and performance of the MCP models. We do not describe the implementation
within GAMS/EMP as the number of lines is long. Refer to [7] for the implementation.
In all settings, the switching strategy was of the smallest MCP size as it did not replicate or create any
variables and equations. Consequently, it showed the best performance in terms of the elapsed time: it was
3 The original model was written by Thomas Rutherford, and was solved by applying the diagonalization method (Gauss-Seidel) to
the nonlinear problem (23) by fixing t variable values belonging to other agents. We modified the model to use our EMP framework,
and it was subsequently solved by PATH.
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up to 6 times faster than the replication strategy and 50 times4 than the substitution strategy. Although it
performed more number of iterations on the problem having 10 agents, its time was still faster than that of
the replication strategy. We believe that the smaller problem size led to faster linear algebra computation.
The substitution strategy was of the largest problem size and showed the slowest elapsed time. The large
size was due to the newly introduced variables and equations as described in Table 1. Although the density of
it was the smallest, the number of nonzero entries was the largest. Hence linear algebra computation became
much slower.
5.3.3 Modeling mixed behavior: price-taking and price-making agents
In this example, we show that mixed behavior of firms, switching between price-takers and price-makers,
can be easily modeled using a shared variable. We revisit the oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in
Section 3.2.1. Previously, the market was an oligopolistic market where all the firms were price-makers:
they can directly affect the price by changing their productions. If they have no control over the price, they
become price-takers, that is, the price is an exogenous variable for each firm. In this case, the market is
perfect competitive.
Listing 13 implements our mixed behavior model. We introduce an implicit variable z that represents
the price p(Q) defined in (4). If a firm has ownership of variable z, then it becomes a price-maker as it
has a direct control of it. Otherwise, it is a price-taker. The first solve on line 32 computes a competitive
market equilibrium. As no firms have ownership of variable z, they are all price-takers in this case. After the
first solve, we compute five different mixed models where firms having indices less than or equal to j are
price-makers at the jth mixed model for j = 1, . . . ,5.
Listing 13: Implementation of mixed behavior of agents within GAMS/EMP
1 sets i agents / 1∗5 /;
2 alias(i,j);
4 parameters c(i) / 1 10, 2 8, 3 6, 4 4, 5 2 /
5 K(i) / 1 5, 2 5, 3 5, 4 5, 5 5 /
6 beta(i) / 1 1.2, 2 1.1, 3 1.0, 4 0.9, 5 0.8 /;
8 variables obj(i), z;
9 positive variables q(i);
11 equations defobj(i), defz;
13 defobj(i)..
14 obj(i) =e= q(i)∗z − (c(i)∗q(i) + beta(i)/(beta(i)+1)∗K(i)∗∗(−1/beta(i))∗q(i)∗∗((beta(
i)+1)/beta(i)));
16 defz..
17 z =e= 5000∗∗(1.0/1.1)∗sum(i, q(i))∗∗(−1.0/1.1);
19 model mixed / defobj, defz /;
21 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
22 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
23 put ’implicit’, z, defz /;
24 loop(i,
4 We did not include the 15-agent problem in the comparison as we think the slowest performance of the substitution strategy is due
to some numerical difficulties PATH encountered.
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25 put ’max ’, obj(i), q(i), defobj(i) /;
26 );
27 putclose empinfo;
29 q.l(i) = 10;
30 z.l = sum(i, q.l(i));
32 solve mixed using emp;
34 parameter objval(i,∗), qval(i,∗), pval(∗), totalobjval(∗), socialwelfare(∗);
36 objval(i,’competitive’) = obj.l(i);
37 qval(i,’competitive’) = q.l(i);
38 pval(’competitive’) = z.l;
39 totalobjval(’competitive’) = sum(i, objval(i,’competitive’));
40 socialwelfare(’competitive’) = (5000∗∗(1.0/1.1)∗11∗sum(i, q.l(i))∗∗(0.1/1.1)
41 − z.l∗sum(i, q.l(i))) + totalobjval(’competitive’);
43 set kind / oligo1, oligo12, oligo123, oligo1234, oligo12345 /;
45 loop(kind,
46 put empinfo ’equilibrium’ /;
47 put ’implicit’, z, defz /;
48 loop(i,
49 if (i.val le ord(kind),
50 put ’max ’, obj(i), q(i), z, defobj(i) /;
51 else
52 put ’max ’, obj(i), q(i), defobj(i) /;
53 );
54 );
55 putclose empinfo;
57 q.l(i) = 10;
58 z.l = sum(i, q.l(i));
60 solve mixed using emp;
62 objval(i,kind) = obj.l(i);
63 qval(i,kind) = q.l(i);
64 pval(kind) = z.l;
65 totalobjval(kind) = sum(i, objval(i,kind));
66 socialwelfare(kind) = (5000∗∗(1.0/1.1)∗11∗sum(i, q.l(i))∗∗(0.1/1.1)
67 − z.l∗sum(i, q.l(i))) + totalobjval(kind);
68 );
Table 4 presents firms’ profits and social welfare of various mixed models. We computed social welfare
by adding the consumer surplus to the total profit of the firms. The consumer surplus was computed by
integrating the inverse demand function less the amount paid by the consumer. In columns starting with
“Oligo”, indices of firms that are price-makers are attached to it. Thus Oligo123 implies that firms with
index 1, 2, or 3 are price-makers, and others are price-takers. As expected, i) the total profit of the firms was
the smallest in the competitive case and the largest in the oligopolistic case; ii) each firm made more profit
as it switched from price-taker to price-maker; iii) the social welfare was the maximized when all firms were
price-takers. Interestingly, switching from a price-taker to a price-maker of a firm made profits of other firms
increase much larger than the one of itself. A similar observation was made in [14] and was explained as an
externality effect.
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Profit Competitive Oligo1 Oligo12 Oligo123 Oligo1234 Oligo12345
Firm 1 123.834 125.513 145.591 167.015 185.958 199.934
Firm 2 195.314 216.446 219.632 243.593 264.469 279.716
Firm 3 257.807 278.984 306.174 309.986 331.189 346.590
Firm 4 302.863 322.512 347.477 373.457 376.697 391.279
Firm 5 327.591 344.819 366.543 388.972 408.308 410.357
Total profit 1207.410 1288.273 1385.417 1483.023 1566.621 1627.875
Social welfare 39063.824 39050.191 39034.577 39022.469 39016.373 39015.125
Table 4: Profits of the firms and social welfare of various mixed models of Listing 13
6 Modeling quasi-variational inequalities
This section introduces a new construct for specifying QVIs within our framework and presents an example
comparing two equivalent ways of defining the equilibrium problems in either GNEP or QVI form.
6.1 Specifying quasi-variational inequalities using our framework
Assuming that the feasible region of a QVI(K,F) takes the form K(x) := {y ∈ Rn | h(y,x) = 0,g(y,x)≤ 0},
Listing 15 shows a generic way of specifying the QVI(K,F) using our framework. In this case, we call x a
parameter variable and y a variable of interest. Parameter variables could appear in the constraints, however,
the QVI function F must be defined by only variables of interest.
Listing 14: Modeling the QVI
1 variables x(i), y(i);
2 equations defF(i), defh, defg;
4 ∗ Definitions of defF(i), defh, and defg are omitted for expository purposes.
6 model qvi / defF, defh, defg /;
8 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
9 putclose empinfo ’qvi defF y x defh defg’;
11 solve qvi using emp;
To specify QVIs, the empinfo file starts with a new keyword qvi. The syntax is similar to the one for VIs
as described in Section 3.1 except that additional variables could follow right after each function-variable
pair. In this case, these additional variables become parameter variables, and the size of them must be the
same as the size of variables of interest in the preceding pair. Our framework then constructs matching infor-
mation between parameter variables and variables of interest. (The same applies to each preceding variable
that is assigned to a zero function.) Therefore, in Listing 15, variables y and x are the variable of interest
and the parameter variable, respectively, and each xi is matched with yi. When our framework formulates the
corresponding MCP, for each constraint it takes the derivative with respect to y, and each occurrence of xi
is replaced with yi using the matching information. Note that if there are no parameter variables, that is, no
variables follow each function-variable pair and each preceding variable, then the problem becomes a VI. In
the above case, the feasible region is a fixed set, K(x) := K, specified by defh and defg.
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6.2 Example
We consider the following QVI(K,F) example in [23, page 14]:
F(y) =
[
− 100
3
+ 2y1+
8
3
y2
−22.5+ 5
4
y1+ 2y2
]
,
K(x) = {0≤ y≤ 11 | y1+ x2 ≤ 15,x1+ y2 ≤ 20}
(24)
Listing 15 describes an implementation of (24). As in (24), we use x as a parameter variable in the
implementation. The implementation is a natural translation of its algebraic form so that users can focus on
the QVI specification itself. Also the empinfo file retains information about variable types so that we can
easily identify which variables are parameter variables and which are variables of interest. This information
can be potentially exploited for the efficient implementation of solution methods for QVIs. Our framework
computes a solution x∗ = (10,5) that is consistent with the one reported in [23].
Listing 15: Implementation of (24) within GAMS/EMP
1 sets i / 1∗2 /;
2 alias(i,j);
4 parameter A(i,j);
5 A(’1’,’1’) = 2;
6 A(’1’,’2’) = 8/3;
7 A(’2’,’1’) = 5/4;
8 A(’2’,’2’) = 2;
10 parameter b(i);
11 b(’1’) = 100/3;
12 b(’2’) = 22.5;
14 parameter Cy(i,j), Cx(i,j);
15 Cy(i,j)$(sameas(i,j)) = 1;
16 Cx(i,j)$(not sameas(i,j)) = 1;
18 parameter rhs(i) / 1 15, 2 20 /;
20 variables y(j), x(j);
21 equations F(i), g(i);
23 F(i)..
24 sum(j, A(i,j)∗y(j)) − b(i) =N= 0;
26 g(i)..
27 sum(j, Cy(i,j)∗y(j)) + sum(j, Cx(i,j)∗x(j)) − rhs(i) =L= 0;
29 model qvi / F, g /;
31 file empinfo / ’%emp.info%’ /;
32 putclose empinfo ’qvi F y x g’;
34 ∗ If bounds on y and x are different, then an intersection of them is taken.
35 y.lo(j) = 0; y.up(j) = 11;
36 x.lo(j) = 0; x.up(j) = 11;
38 solve qvi using emp;
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One can easily check that the QVI (24) is equivalent to the GNEP (5) in Section 3.2.2 in terms of solu-
tions. Actually, all the equilibrium examples described in previous sections can be equivalently formulated
as QVIs in the manner of Proposition 1.
However, the information provided to our framework could be different depending on the formulations.
The GNEP formulation (5) gives us each agent’s information: its objective function and ownership of vari-
ables and constraints. It may not be easy to recover this information from the QVI formulation. In general,
we can collect more information from an equilibrium formulation. This could result in different solutions
methods such as a Gauss-Seidel method and its variants, while it may not be possible to collect similar in-
formation from the QVI formulation. Therefore, for equilibrium problems, it may be better to not use the
QVI formulation. Since our QVI framework is not just limited to QVIs derived from equilibrium problems,
it can be used to explicitly model other types of QVIs with possible specialized algorithms for solution.
7 Conclusions
We have presented an extended mathematical programming framework for equilibrium programming. The
framework defines a new set of constructs that enable equilibrium problems with shared constraints and
shared variables and their variational forms to be specified in modeling languages. Its syntax is a natural
translation of the corresponding algebraic formulation of the problem that captures high-level structure. This
allows more readable and less error prone models to be specified compared to the traditional complementar-
ity based models that require the derivative computation of the Lagrangian by hand. Different solution types
such as variational equilibria associated with shared constraints can be easily specified and computed using
our framework. We define shared variables and their associated constructs that can be used to model sparse
formulations, some forms of EPECs, price-taking and price-making agents, shared objective functions, and
so on. We introduce a new construct for specifying QVIs.
There is potential for future work. Using the high-level information captured by our framework, we
can design decomposition algorithms to solve large-scale equilibrium problems that may involve a huge
number of agents. We intend to allow implicit variables to be defined using nonsmooth equations [25].
We plan to extend our framework to incorporate equilibrium problems including agents solving stochastic
programs, bilevel programming, other forms of EPECs, all with consideration of shared constraints and
shared variables, and to implement the EMP in other modeling systems such as AMPL and Julia.
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